A commonly occurring feature we see in event mishap reporting is Pilots Monitoring (PMs) admitting that they were torn between whether to verbalize their concern about the Pilot Flying’s (PF’s) actions (make a callout) or to remain silent. Too often, they choose silence. This occurs much more often with PM/FOs and PF/Captains. The reasons for this include deference to experience, flightdeck authority gradient, the desire to maintain flightdeck rapport, indecision about what to say, role synchronization, reluctance to say something that would be recorded, and plan continuation bias.
Deference to experience: With the high retirement rate and strong growth of the airline industry, the typical time that a career pilot serves in the FO seat before upgrading to Captain has significantly shortened. This means that in almost all situations, Captains have far more experience in the aircraft and the airline’s operations than their FOs. As complexity rises and time available shrinks, FOs often suppress their concerns about undesirable trends. “The Captain has been here a lot longer than me. They must know what they are doing.” “The Captain must see something that I am missing or misunderstanding. They don’t seem as concerned as me.”
Authority gradient: Authority gradient is the perceived hierarchical distance between people in different organizational positions. Think of it as the slope that people perceive separating themselves and others. A new-hire pilot flying with a check pilot perceives a very steep slope. They might be quite reluctant to voice their concerns or make callouts. Consider how much steeper it becomes when the Captain is our chief pilot (with the power to fire us). As FOs gain time and experience, this slope eases. Imagine how gentle the slope would appear to an FO on the cusp of Captain upgrade while flying with a newly upgraded Captain.
The desire to maintain flightdeck rapport: Flightdeck environments evolve dynamically. Consider how the environment changes from when a crew flies their first flight together compared with how it might feel after three days of flying (and socializing) together. How about other combinations like two pilots who dislike each other, two pilots who are close friends, or two pilots who are family members. Regardless of the combination, we all want the flightdeck environment to remain cordial and friendly. Making a callout can feel like we are challenging their abilities or professionalism. The callout can feel like it is disrupting (or even violating) that rapport. This reluctance also affects Captains who worry that speaking up will make them seem too authoritarian or adversely affect crew effectiveness.
Indecision about what to say: In my book, I discuss the various types of callouts. The easiest category are procedurally scripted callouts. These are the standard callouts that are clearly directed in our manuals. They generally highlight exceedances of parameters with callouts like “AIRSPEED” or “GLIDESLOPE”. The next level are unscripted callouts. These callouts highlight undesirable trends that may not be specifically addressed in our procedures. For example, if the Captain is distracted by an inside-the-flightdeck task during taxi movement, the FO/PM might state “We are drifting, we need to come right.” Notice that the specific wording of this callout is not specified in our manuals. Also, these kind of callouts may include descriptive or directive wording. In the book, I highlight a third category of risky decisions where we challenge the gameplan that the PF has chosen. The reason why these cases are not addressed in our manuals is because they are too numerous and variable. It would prove onerous and unrealistic to compile a comprehensive list. Additionally, the wording is highly dependent on time available. A callout about an unstabilized approach at 200’ might include descriptive wording while a callout in the flare might just direct “GO AROUND”. The bottom line is that more variable and time sensitive the situation, the more reluctant many PMs feel to speak up.
Role synchronization: I addressed this in Topic 23-4: The Importance of Staying Out-of-Synch. Under stress, many PMs find themselves aligning their perspective with the PF’s. They essentially become non-flying PFs. As they become sympathetic with the PF’s dilemma, they fall into the same “work harder to make the gameplan work out” mindset. Since both pilots are thinking the same thoughts, the need to speak up feels unnecessary.
Reluctance to say something that would be recorded: We all know that everything we say on the flightdeck is preserved on the CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder). Mishap pilots have reported that they were either reluctant to highlight the PF’s errors or were unsure about which words to use. Often this manifests as pointing or hinting. Overloaded PFs report never seeing the PM point or hearing their hints.
Plan continuation bias: A strong psychological bias driving flightdeck silence is plan continuation bias. The more complex, task saturated, and time constrained pilots feel, the more unlikely they are to abandon their gameplan and start over. They find themselves working harder to force the progress of their existing game plan. When the PM looks over at the PF and sees that they are fully engaged and committed to making the gameplan work out, they feel reluctant to disrupt their determination. While working harder to make a familiar game plan work is appropriate in many situations, there comes a point where we need to recognize the failing trend, abort the current gameplan, and reset the situation. PM silence tends to emerge in event reports with statements like:
- “I was just about to say something.”
- “I was so surprised by their actions, I didn’t know what to say”
- “The go-around callout was on the tip of my tongue during that whole approach.”
- “In hindsight, I’m embarrassed that I didn’t speak up.”
All of these contributors to PM silence emerge from flawed assumptions. In interviews with mishap crews, we commonly hear PMs express statements starting with “I thought…”, “I assumed…”, “They already knew…”, and “They must have known…”. Grounded in these flawed assumptions and fueled by flightdeck culture, the path of least resistance promotes silence by both PFs and PMs.
This social dynamic becomes especially important because task-overloaded PFs need an especially strong stimulus to break free from their tunneled attention and plan continuation bias. That is why we direct PMs to make strong callouts like “GO AROUND”. Lacking this decisive callout, PFs interpret silence as consent to continue. The irony is that PFs later report that they wished that their PMs had been more decisive. While consumed by the many details within the situation’s complexity, PFs lacked the big picture of the gameplan’s deterioration. This is why we rely on PMs to maintain the larger perspective by not only assessing the accuracy of the PFs flying, but also the quality, trajectory, and appropriateness of their gameplan.
As PMs, it is better to make the callouts and clearly communicate our concerns as early as possible during a deteriorating situation. This gives the crew the most time to mentally step back, assess the trajectory of the game plan, and either choose to continue or abort the gameplan. This promotes a mechanistic approach to callouts. We should never doubt whether we should make a callout. Any time we detect exceedances or adverse trends, we make the callout. Our discretion lies with timing and wording. The earlier we start our callouts, the more time we both have to assess and discuss the situation. Additionally, it allows the PM to escalate the callouts in case the PF doesn’t comply. More on that in a later discussion topic.
