Following is a birdstrike event (#1700045) from the NASA ASRS database.
Captain’s Narrative: Taking off on Runway XXR at ZZZ, I was pilot flying. Approaching V1 we noticed a large bird with an estimated wing span of ten feet appear out of nowhere on the right side of center just in front of the aircraft. I was hoping the blue heron would climb out and not hit us for if it did, it would hit either the right cockpit window, the right side of the fuselage and the First Officer's sensors, or the right engine. I was concentrating on the runway center line trying not to be distracted when the impact occurred. WHAM somewhere on the right side. I did not know if it hit the engine or the right side of the fuselage, I knew it hit and there was a serious chance of impending damage and possible injuries. I still had my hands on the throttles, we were still on the ground just a few kts. from rotation when I rejected the takeoff. I pulled the throttles to idle as my First Officer announced V1 but I was committed. I went into full reverse, felt the auto-brakes kick in and we rapidly decelerated. Approaching a safe taxi speed I de-selected the auto-brakes, heard my First Officer state "Remain Seated, Remain Seated!" to the passengers. I taxied off the runway and when I knew we had sufficient clearance from the runway I set the parking brake. My First Officer had the QRC out and we made sure we performed all the pertinent items on the checklist. Then we secured the right engine to minimize any possible damage.
We did not know the extent of the damage, if any, to the aircraft. I checked with the flight attendants to ensure the cabin was undamaged and the passengers were safe and secure. I made a quick announcement over the PA to assure the passengers of what happened then went back to my duties. We initially stated to Ground Control no assistance was needed but a very short attempt to taxi revealed we had problems. We quickly noticed the aircraft was listing one or two degrees and we knew the tires were deflating. The brake temperature indicators were all over 900 degrees. We called Ground Control and asked for assistance. Shortly the ZZZ fire department arrived and hosed the tires and main landing gear area with plain water. The fire department informed us the tires were smoking and small flames were on the wheels. They extinguished all and checked for damage which they did not find.
We checked with the [company] Operations, informed them of the situation and made other phone calls to ensure proper agencies and corporate entities were informed. We also kept the flight attendants and passengers involved. Later the boarding steps and buses arrived and we de-planed the passengers with their carry-on luggage into the waiting buses.
No passengers were injured, no damage was done to the aircraft except the deflated tires.
FO’s Narrative: The event occurred while taking off on Runway XXR at ZZZ on an A319. The aircraft had a final takeoff weight of 139.3 and calculated V1-145 kts., VR-145 kts. and V2-150 kts. for a Flaps 1 reduced thrust takeoff. I was the Pilot Monitoring during the takeoff. The aircraft was operating normally through the takeoff roll and as we were approaching the " V1" callout (V1-5) we noticed a very large bird (I estimate a 10-12ft wingspan) appear in front of and slightly to the right of center at cockpit height above the runway. The bird appeared out of nowhere and I was fully expecting it to impact my First Officer side front window as it was not moving to avoid the aircraft. I used a composite crosscheck to ensure the V1 callout at the correct time and also try and gauge the relative movement of the bird to the aircraft. Before I opened my mouth to announce " V1" (at V1-5 kts., 140 kts. in this case) the bird impacted the aircraft just below my front window on the nose and I saw a very large black mass move past my lower right peripheral. It's trajectory past the nose and down the right side of the fuselage led me to believe that it was going to take out right side fuselage sensors and most likely be ingested into Engine #2 causing further damage.
Based on the strong impact and very loud bang happening just before I got the V1 call announced I saw the Captain had already initiated the reject when I called V1. I then monitored the CDUs and PFD for proper speed brake deployment, full thrust reverser deployment, deceleration and potential damage to Engine #2. The auto brakes engaged and we rapidly decelerated. I called "80 kts." as we slowed below that speed and then announced "Remain Seated, Remain Seated" over the PA. I also notified Tower of our reject on Runway XXR and told them to stand by for further coordination after we cleared the runway. The auto brakes were deselected upon reaching a safe taxi speed and I pulled up the rejected takeoff QRC to run once we were clear of the runway. We taxied off the runway and set the parking brake in order to run the QRC and Rejected Takeoff non-normal checklist. We also secured Engine #2 in order to minimize any potential damage.
The Captain was coordinating with the cabin crew to check on the state of the cabin and the passengers while I was giving ZZZ Operations an initial notification of the event. We then called for further taxi away from the runway onto a taxiway and to standby for any further assistance requests. After a very short taxi I informed the Captain that I felt that the aircraft listing to the right a few degrees and he agreed. We immediately stopped for suspected tire deflation. We cross checked the brake temperature indicators and they were increasing above 900 degrees with a peak of 980 degrees.
We called ZZZ Ground Control to dispatch fire department trucks to assist in helping determine the state of the aircraft. Upon arrival at the aircraft the fire department stated that they observed smoke and some small flames on the wheel assembly. They then proceeded to spray the tires and main landing gear at regular intervals to extinguish the flames and cool the brakes. We regularly communicated with the fire chief over the radio relaying brake temperatures until they went down to 50 degrees across all main brakes. They conducted multiple inspections during the process and did not find any damage to aircraft except the deflated tires.
During this period we also coordinated with [Company] Operations, Maintenance via ACARS, Dispatch and other appropriate entities to make sure all were informed. We requested boarding steps and buses for the passengers be readied so that we could deplane them and take them back to the terminal once it was safe to do so. The cabin crew also reported no injuries to anyone on board the aircraft.
After all passengers were off the aircraft we ran the parking checklist, absent setting the parking brake for previous events, before turning the aircraft over to Maintenance and deplaned the aircraft ourselves. We inspected the bird strike areas with the fire department and maintenance personnel and found initial strikes on the Engine #2 cowling and inboard leading edge of the right wing.
Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported that a large bird strike just prior to V1 resulted in a rejected takeoff and a minor wheel fire.
Discussion: This is a fairly classic birdstrike-during-takeoff event. The rejected takeoff decision was fairly straightforward. Since they were below V1, The Captain didn’t take time to analyze the engines. They knew that it was a large bird and that that they had just hit it. Some discussion questions:
- How does our attention level affect how well we recover from startle/surprise?
- How much (or what kind of) “decision making” was involved with the Captain’s decision to reject this takeoff?
- What CRM factors were reported by the pilots? While we don’t know much about flightdeck dialog, what useful dialog should have been used?
- How did their event evolve in complexity and novelty? What resources could they have employed to improve their response?
Let me open the discussion by making some observations.
Discussion: This is a fairly classic birdstrike-during-takeoff event. The rejected takeoff decision was fairly straightforward. Since they were below V1, The Captain didn’t take time to analyze the engines. They knew that it was a large bird and that that they had just hit it. Some discussion questions:
How does our attention level affect how well we recover from startle/surprise?
- How much (or what kind of) “decision making” was involved with the Captain’s decision to reject this takeoff?
Frankly, very little. The Captain reacted quickly and instinctively. Since it is unlikely that they had experienced such an event in line-flying, we can assume that their simulator training guided their reaction. I address this extensively in Chapter 23 of Master Airline Pilot. Reaction to time-critical events like this are aided by our “Rehearsal, Body Positioning, First Look, and First Step” strategy.
They also didn’t report taking even a moment to contemplate their reject decision. This is supported by the FO’s account that, while they were about to announce “V1”, the Captain had already begun rejecting takeoff.
It is also interesting that the Captain reported that the FO had announced V1, but the FO reported that the Captain had already begun the reject “before I opened my mouth”. This is fairly common with high-stress events like this – where our recollection of the actual event details is affected by our past events that we have practiced/experience or with what we think should have happened. Also, it is interesting that the FO reported a blue heron with a 10-12' wingspan, since they typically span 6-7' - clearly it looked much bigger.
- What CRM factors were reported by the pilots? While we don’t know much about flightdeck dialog, what useful dialog should have been used?
Neither pilot reported that the Captain verbally directed or announced the reject. Surely, this is the trained procedure, but while immersed in-the-moment, startle and surprise can interdict even the most frequently practiced procedures. It doesn’t cause a problem, but it is worth some discussion.
Following the initial startle and high pace of the reject, their crew coordination appears excellent. Noticed how they divided the workload to complete independent tasks more quickly. The Captain focused on the inflight crew and passengers while the FO coordinated with their station operations. Whoever handled the ATC coordination is not clear as both pilots report what they did as a crew.
- How did their event evolve in complexity and novelty? What resources could they have employed to improve their response?
Notice how they started with a typical “simulator response” strategy of completing the RTO, telling the passengers to remain seated, and coordinating for taxi back to the gate. In the simulator, the scenario typically ends here, the instructor resets the sim, and we move on to the next training event. They even informed ATC that emergency response was unnecessary. The event quickly became much more complex and nuanced as the tire temperatures spiked and the tire fuse plugs melted. The Captain reported that the aircraft listed to one side. They never reported melted fuse plugs on the other side. Does this infer something about braking technique? We don’t know if this airline employed autobraking. If not, perhaps it indicates that the Captain applied much stronger brake pedal pressure on the side that failed.
We don’t know what additional procedures the crew employed. Typically, crews are advised to turn “into the wind” to clear smoke away from the front of the aircraft, not to set the parking brakes, and to give emergency response crews a clear angle to fight any ensuing brake or tire fire. In this case, there was smoke and fire, so it proved quite useful to have fire trucks on scene.
We also don’t know if they kept the engines running or whether they started the APU (not always the best idea because smoke can be ingested into the APU intake and pumped into the passenger cabin). We also don’t know the time lapse between telling ATC that an emergency response wasn’t necessary, discovering the tire deflation, calling for the fire trucks, and the fire crews spraying the wheel assemblies to extinguish the “small fires” and dissipate the smoke.
Our lessons-learned are that we should probably always call for emergency crew response following any high-energy rejected takeoff. At best, the tires will deflate. At worst, the excessive heat will ignite the omnipresent oils, fluids, and greases on and around the wheel assemblies.
